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Student Due Process Rights in Academic
Dismissals from the Public Schools
R. LAWRENCE DESSEM*
Introduction
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.,
This broad statement of the importance of education in Brown v. Board of
Education "has lost none of its vitality with the passage of time. '2 The
contemporary importance of education within our society is reflected perhaps
most dramatically in the educational prerequisites to many jobs3 and the
calculations made of the increased earning power to be gained from addi-
tional years of schooling. 4 As the Supreme Court has itself noted,5 the value of
education within our society can also be gaged by the fact that all of the fifty
states have established public school systems, and all but one of the states
have compulsory education laws.6 Although education is not a fundamental
constitutional right,7 the educative process and the resultant degrees and
* B.A., Macalester College, 1973; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1976; clerk to Judge William K.
Thomas, N.D. Ohio.
' Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
3 College or professional degrees are generally required by state law or regulation before one
can become a public school teacher, physician, attorney, dentist or pharmacist. See, e.g., MAss.
GEN. LAvs ch. 71, sec. 38G (teachers); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, sec. 2 (physicians); MASS.
SUPREME Judicial Ct. Rule 3.01(3) (b) (attorneys); MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, sec. 45 (dentists);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, sec. 24 (pharmacists).
4Social scientists have documented some of the quantifiable economic consequences of a
college or graduate degree. Note: Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond
the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L. J. 120, 128 (1974). See also Table No. 200 ["Lifetime and
Mean Income of Males in Current and Constant (1972 Dollars), by Years of School Completed:
1956 to 1972"] in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE U.S. FACT BOOK, 123 (1975), which shows the
stronj positive correlation, if not the causative link, between years of education and income
level.
5 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954).
6 CHILDREN's DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA, Table 1, 57 (1974).
Mississippi is the only state without a compulsory education law.
7 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
277
HeinOnline  -- 5 J.L. & Educ. 277 1976
278 Journal of Law-Education
diplomas received have become extremely important within American soci-
ety.
This article, however, goes beyond the argument that education is one of
the most valuable benefits which government in this country provides. The
thesis of the article is that education is not only very important to millions of
Americans, but that students have constitutionally protected liberty and
property interests in their public educations and the courts should therefore
require notice and hearing prior to the deprivation of these interests, even
when the deprivation is for strictly academic reasons. Although the article's
analysis is restricted to a consideration of the duty of public institutions to
provide fair hearing procedures, some courts have held, and several commen-
tators have argued, that the mandates of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution are equally applicable to today's "private" schools
and universities. 8
It should finally be noted that no discussion of student rights in academic
dismissal decisions is complete without recognition of the student responsibil-
ity which must accompany such rights. The "Joint Statement of Rights and
Freedoms of Students" -which has been endorsed by the American Associa-
tion of University Professors, the U.S. National Student Association, and
other groups of students and educators-makes the connection between stu-
dent rights and responsibilities in the area of academic evaluation very clear:
Students should have protection through orderly procedures against prejudiced
or capricious academic evaluation. At the same time, they are responsible for
maintaining standards of academic performance established for each course in
which they are enrolled.8
The Constitution in the Classroom
Before moving on to a consideration of the particular issue at hand-
judicial involvement in the decision to dismiss a student for academic rea-
sons -it is important to lay the background of the traditional judicial defer-
ence to the educational process against which such an issue must be dis-
cussed.10 For, as the Supreme Court said in Epperson v. Arkansas, "Judicial
8 See, e.g., Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Hammond v. Univer-
sity of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Belk v. Chancellor of Washington
Univ., 336 F.Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Note: State Action: Theories forApplying Constitutional
Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974); Note Common Law Rights for
Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L. J. 120 (1974);
Hendrickson, "State Action" and Private Higher Education, 2 J. LAW & ED. 53 (1973); O'Neil,
Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970); Note: An Overview: The
Private University and Due Process, 1970 DuKE L. J. 795 (1970); Wilkinson & Rolapp, Private
Colleges and Student Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J. 121 (1970). But see Wahba v. New York Univer-
sity, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam).
9 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 258, 259 (9 II B)
(1968).
10 For general bibliographies in the area of law and education see KiRP & YUDOF, EDUCA-
TIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (1974); HoGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1974).
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interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises
problems requiring care and restraint .... By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities."'1
In recent years, however, the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court,
have entered the area of public schooling in many extremely significant and
far-reaching decisions. The public outcry at Supreme Court decisions such as
Brown v. Board of Education,12 Engel v. Vitale,13 and School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp14 should not obscure the significance of other
recent Court decisions which have also greatly influenced the everyday life of
both student and teacher in the classroom.' 5
Thus a tension has arisen in attempts to balance the traditional notion of
local control and autonomy in the functioning of the public schools and the
Supreme Court's more recent realization that "Students in school as well as
out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution."'1 6 The premise which
guides this article's resolution of the tension between school autonomy and
student rights has been perhaps best put by Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for
the Supreme Court in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not ex-
cepted .... That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. 17
Court Review of Academic Grading Decisions in the Public Schools
Although the Supreme Court has decided many cases significantly affect-
ing the daily routine in our nation's public-school classrooms, courts have
traditionally been wary of any judicial involvement in or oversight of school
grading decisions. Court challenges to school grading decisions stem from at
least the early years of this century,' 8 but such cases have increased in recent
years and rather uniformly draw upon the reasoning and standards enunci-
ated in the 1965 decision of Connelly v. University of Vermont and State
Agricultural College.19
The plaintiff in Connelly was a third-year medical student at the Univer-
sity of Vermont College of Medicine who had become ill during the school
term and failed the make-up course which he took during the next summer.
This failure led to the student's dismissal from the medical school, and he
11 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
,3 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
14 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
15 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Tinker V.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
16 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
17 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
"8 See cases collected in 86 A.L.R. 484 (1933).
19 244 F.Supp. 156 (D.Vt. 1965).
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then brought suit in Vermont federal district court to challenge this dis-
missal, alleging that the professor involved had decided prior to the com-
mencement of the course that the plaintiff would receive a failing grade. The
court held that such an allegation was sufficient to withstand the University's
motion for summary judgment and that if the plaintiff could prove his
allegation, he would be entitled to a university hearing concerning his
dismissal order.
The Connelly court stressed that the ultimate grading decision must al-
ways remain with the school authorities: "Whether the plaintiff should or
should not have received a passing grade for the period in question is a matter
wholly within the jurisdiction of the school authorities, who alone are quali-
fied to make such a determination. '20 The court's holding was merely that if
the student could show that the school officials had acted "arbitrarily, capri-
ciously or in bad faith" in dismissing him, the court would then "order the
defendant University to give the plaintiff a fair and impartial hearing on his
dismissal order. ' 2 1 Thus in the absence of an arbitrary, capricious or bad faith
decision on the part of the school officials, a predismissal hearing at the
university would not be required.
Connelly has been followed by several cases which have adopted both its
reasoning and its arbitrary, capricious or bad faith test for school grading
decisions. Several medical students have followed Thomas Connelly to the
courts, only to be stopped in their efforts to obtain school hearings on their
dismissals because of their inability to meet the Connelly standard of arbi-
trariness.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida in Militana v. University of
Miami2 refused to order any hearing concerning the dismissal of a third-year
medical student, stating that "[n]otice of charges and an opportunity to be
heard are certainly essential to due process and required when a student is
dropped from school for disciplinary reasons; however, such is not required
when the dismissal is for academic failure." The Supreme Court of Alabama
has also relied upon Connelly in refusing to order a hearing prior to the
dismissal of a student from the University of Alabama Medical School,
concluding that "[e]ven the federal courts have not yet gone so far as to
require the notice and presence of the student when a decision is being
reached to dismiss a student for failing to meet the required scholastic
standards. '2
4
Another case involving the dismissal of a third-year medical student is
Wong v. Regents of the University of California,25 which also heavily relied
upon Connelly, but which held that the plaintiff's allegations were, in effect,
allegations of arbitrary, capricious or bad faith action on the part of the school
authorities and that the student's petition for a hearing was therefore suffi-
cient to withstand the university's request for summary judgment.
20 Id. at 161.
21Id,
22 236 So.2d 162 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971).
23 Id. at 164.
24 MUStell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 367, 211 So. 2d 489, 498, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968).
25 15 Cal. App.3d 823, 9 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1971).
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One final case in which a student challenged his academic dismissal from
medical school is Lukacs v. Curators of the University of Missouri,26 in which
the federal district court quoted the Connelly standard and its statement
that "It is only when the school authorities abuse ... [their academic]
discretion that a court may interfere with their decision to dismiss a stu-
dent."27 In Lukacs, however, the student involved had been granted a hearing
before the Promotions and Advisory Committee of the medical school, and
reliance upon Connelly was therefore not essential to the court's decision to
refuse the student any relief.
To substantiate its reliance upon Connelly, the court in Lukacs also cited
the 1973 decision of Brookins v. Bonnell.28 In Brookins a nursing student
challenged his dismissal from a community college nursing program on the
basis of his alleged failure to attend classes regularly and to submit to the
school a physical examination report and a transcript from a previous nursing
school. The court stated that "[i]t is also established that 'due process' does
not require notice and a hearing for a student expelled for scholastic failure"
(citing Connelly),29 but went on to hold that Brookins' dismissal was not for
scholastic deficiencies but rather for alleged disciplinary violations. The court
therefore held that the student was entitled to notice and hearing prior to his
dismissal.
The Teiith Circuit Court of Appeals reached a somewhat different resolu-
tion of the issue of dismissal of a student from nursing school in Gaspar v.
Bruton.30 The student in Gaspar had actually been accorded very full hearing
rights prior to her dismissal, but the court nevertheless went on to consider
her claim that the hearing had been constitutionally deficient. The court first
held that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez,31 Mrs.
Gaspar had a property right within the terms of the due process clause in her
continued attendance at the school. The court nonetheless thought that
Connelly's "rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs"32 was appli-
cable and that consequently "[t]he court may grant relief, as a practical
matter, only in those cases where the student presents positive evidence of ill
will or bad motive." 33 The court then concluded that:
[S]chool authorities, in order to satisfy Due Process prior to termination or
suspension of a student for deficiencies in meeting minimum academic perform-
ance, need only advise that student with respect to such deficiencies in any form.
All that is required is that the student be made aware prior to termination of his
failure or impending failure to meet those standards.34
Students in the health-care professions are not alone in their resort to the
courts in recent years to challenge dismissals from public schools. In Keys v.
- No. 74 CV 109-C (W.D. Mo. July 23, 1974).27 1d. at 9.
2 362 F.Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
23Id. at 382.
- 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
31 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
32 Connelly, 244 F. Supp. at 160 (1965).
13Gasper, 513 F.2d at 851 (10th Cir. 1975).
3l4 d.
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Sawyer35 a law student petitioned the federal courts to have failing grades in
two of his courses changed. Although the case was decided on the basis of
other issues, the court stated that an additional reason for its refusal to aid
the student was its belief that "He [the professor] should be given the
unfettered opportunity to assess a student's performance and determine if it
attains a standard of scholarship required by that professor for a satisfactory
grade."36 The court did not mention whether it would act in the presence of a
proven allegation of arbitrary, capricious or bad faith action.
Doctoral students have been another group which have challenged educa-
tional evaluations of their work. The New York Supreme Court, Special
Term, adopted a standard similar to the Connelly test in its holding in Edde
v. Columbia University37 that in the absence of an "arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable" 38 refusal to accept plaintiff's doctoral thesis, the court could
grant the student no relief. More recently, in Stevenson v. Board of Regents
of the University of Texas,39 the federal district court for the Western District
of Texas cited the standard established in Connelly, but did not have to
determine whether the University of Texas had acted arbitrarily or in bad
faith, since the student involved had, in fact, been granted a hearing prior to
his dismissal from the school's doctoral program.
The final case which should be mentioned is Greenhill v. Bailey,40 in which
a student challenged his dismissal from the University of Iowa medical
school. The federal district court which initially heard the case held that it
"[n]eed not decide whether the claimed status is 'liberty' or 'property' within
the protection of the fourteenth amendment because the cases are clear that
notice and hearing are not required when a student is dismissed for failure to
meet academic standards. '41 The plaintiff's failure to show that the decision
was arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith thus resulted in the court rejecting
his request for an order requiring a medical school hearing.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found this case to be outside the
rationale of Connelly, however, since the university had done more than just
dismiss Greenhill from its medical school. The university had also notified
the Association of American Medical Colleges of Greenhill's dismissal, noting
that the apparent reason for Greenhill's failure was "lack of intellectual
ability or insufficient preparation." While recognizing that courts do not
usually intervene in school grading decisions (and citing Connelly), the Court
of Appeals thought that Greenhill's dismissal was not of the usual variety.
The court noted that "The information communicated outside the medical
school goes beyond a factual statement that Greenhill had failed his junior
3 353 F.Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
6Id. at 939-40.
37 8 N.Y. Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S. 2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1957), affd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 780, 175
N.Y.S. 2d 556 (1958), appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y. 2d 881, 156 N.E. 2d 458, 182 N.Y.S. 2d 829, cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 956 (1959).
-Id. at 795, 168 N.Y.S. 2d at 644.
39 393 F.Supp. 812 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
- 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
41 378 F.Supp. 632, 633 (S.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
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year, or a mere recitation of academic grades, and suggests that Greenhill is
intellectually unfit to undertake the study of medicine at all. '42
The Court of Appeals never reached the issue of whether or not Greenhill
had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued attendance at
the medical school, but concluded that he did have a constitutional right to
notice and hearing prior to being so stigmatized by the school's letter that
entry into any other medical school had become impossible.43 The court,
however, did not believe that the dismissal of Greenhill absent this letter
would have deprived him of any constitutionally protected liberty, its holding
being a very narrow one:
We hold that the action by the school in denigrating Greenhilrs intellectual
ability, as distinguished from his performance, deprived him of a significant
interest in liberty, for it admittedly "imposed on him a stigma or other disability
that foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other ... opportunities." 44
Thus, although the Eighth Circuit in Greenhill v. Bailey has gone farther
than any other court in requiring a due process hearing prior to academic
dismissal, not even Greenhill stands for the proposition that students are, as
a matter or course, entitled to notice and hearing before academic dismissal
from a public university.45
Student Due Process Rights in School Disciplinary Decisions
In contrast to "the rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs," 46
courts have not been nearly so deferential to disciplinary suspensions and
dismissals from the public schools. 47 Prior to the Supreme Court's recent
entry into the area of school discipline in Goss v. Lopez,48 the "landmark
decision" in this area of constitutional law was the opinion of the Fifth Circuit
42 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir. 1975).
43 The Supreme Court's recent narrowing and reinterpretation of the "liberty interest"
protected by the due process clasuses of the fifth and fourteenth Amendments in Paul v. Davis,
44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976) should not undermine the validity of the Eighth Circuit's
decision as to the infringement of Greenhill's interest in liberty. For not only was the student's
general reputation harmed, but a "right or status previously recognized by state law was
distinctly altered or extinguished," Id., at 4343, since Greenhill was both dismissed from the
state medical school and would not be considered for readmission in the future. Appellant's
brief in Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975) at 9, 51.44 Id., quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
4 Although it is the thesis of this article that the courts should require schools to hold due
process hearings prior to all academic dismissals, it is possible that student rights could also be
protected by a broader reading of the current "arbitrary, capricious or bad faith" standard of
judicial review of such dismissals. To protect students to the full extent advocated in this
article, however, every academic dismissal would have to be considered arbitrary or capricious,
and it therefore seems wiser to develop a new theory for protecting student rights than to so
stretch the present standard.
4 Connelly 244 F.Supp. at 160.
47 For a bibliography of books and articles dealing with student disciplinary rights see
HoGAN, supra note 10 at 205, 211-14.
4419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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Court of Appeals in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education.49 The Dixon
court held that "notice and some opportunity for hearing" are constitutionally
mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prior to the
expulsion of students for disciplinary reasons from a state university. 50
The Dixon court refused to be bound by the notion of any right/privilege
distinction inherent in the requirements of due process, stating that:
It is not enough to say, as did the district court in the present case, "The right to
attend a public college or university is not in and of itself a constitutional right.
[citation omitted]... [Ilt is necessary to consider "the nature both of the private
interest which has been impaired and the governmental power which has been
exercised." 5 1
The Dixon decision was followed by a flood of other federal cases in which
the rationale of Dixon was argued to be applicable to expulsions from public
high schools and to both long and short-term suspensions from public univers-
ities and secondary schools.5 2 The varying results in the short-term suspen-
sion cases were at least partly resolved by the Supreme Court's entry into this
area with its 1975 decision in Goss v. Lopez.53
The Supreme Court in Goss was faced with the suspensions of junior and
senior high school students and held that "[d]ue process requires, in connec-
tion with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or
written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explana-
tion of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story. '54 The Court's decision was based upon students' "legitimate
claims of entitlement to a public education" stemming from the Ohio laws
which provide for free public education and make that education compul-
sory.55 Thus the Court did not have to confront the school system's contention
that there is no constitutional right to a secondary school education at public
expense.
Since the students involved were found to have such a statutory entitle-
ment to a public secondary education, the state could only deprive them of
that property interest by adherence to the mandates of due process of law. In
addition to this property interest, however, the Supreme Court held that the
students had also been subject to an arbitrary deprivation of a constitution-
ally protected liberty. The Court here followed its earlier decisions in Board
of Regents v. Roth 6 and Wisconsin v. Constantineau,7 in which it was held
that "[w]here a person's name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
49 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
501d. at 158.
51294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), quoting Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961). See also Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. RIv. 1439 (1968).
52See the cases collected in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n. 8 (1975).
53 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
541d. at 581.
55Id. at 573 (1975).
5r408 U.S. 564 (1972).
57 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to
be heard are essential."' 8 In Goss the Court said of the charges of misconduct,
that "[i]f sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the
students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as
interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment. ' ' 9
The majority opinion in Goss provoked a spirited dissent from Mr. Justice
Powell, which was joined in by three other members of the Court. The dissent
argued that "[t]he decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial interven-
tion in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the
quality of education."60 The dissent further predicted that "[t]oday's ruling
appears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of
discretionary decisions in the educational process."'6 Although justices often
overstate the impact of an opinion with which they disagree, 62 it is significant
for the purposes of this article that Mr. Justice Powell included on his list of
formerly discretionary decisions which may now be subject to judicial scru-
tiny "how to grade the student's work, whether a student passes or fails a
course."63
The Constitutional Right to a Hearing Prior to Academic Dismissal from
the Public Schools
After consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez, the
traditional judicial refusal to require hearings prior to academic dismissals in
the absence of arbitrary, capricious or bad faith action appears anomalous. It
seems a strange system, indeed, in which a junior high school student must
be granted notice and hearing prior to a disciplinary suspension of no more
than ten days, while medical or doctoral students can be dismissed from
school permanently without any of the protections of the due process clause
coming into play.
Perhaps the contrast is a misleading one, however, since the applicability
of the due process clause does not depend upon the seriousness of the loss
which is threatened by the governmental action. The Supreme Court in
Board of Regents v. Roth64 established the constitutional test to be used to
determine whether an interest is protected as "property" or "liberty" under
the due process clause: " [ W]hether due process requirements apply in the first
,8ld. at 437.
59419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975). But cf. the narrowed reading of the liberty interest in reputation
in Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976), discussed in text accompanying notes
72-79, infra.
60 Goss, 419 U.S. at 585 (1975).
61Id. at 597 (1975).
62The Supreme Court itself, in the context of statutory interpretation, has described the
tendency of the opponents of a proposal to overstate that proposal's impact: "[W]e have often
cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the view of its
legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its
reach." National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local
760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
-419 U.S. 565, 597 (1975).
64408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at
stake."r5
To be a protected property interest under the due process clause, interests
need not be constitutionally created. "Protected interests in property are
normally 'not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined' by an independent source such as state statutes or
rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. '66 In Goss the Supreme Court
found that the state statutes which established the state secondary school
system gave the students "legitimate claims of entitlement to a public educa-
tion," and therefore the students could not be excluded from the classroom for
even ten days without a prior hearing on their alleged misconduct. 67
Since state statutes similar to the one invoked in Goss also provide for
public higher education, 6 the Goss analysis leads to the conclusion that
university students at such schools have a property interest in their higher
education comparable to the property interest found to exist in Goss. 69 In fact,
the lower courts-most notably the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education 7 0 -have held in the context of disciplinary dismissals
that state university students do have such a protectable property interest.
In addition to a student's right to maintain his attendance at a public
university, the property interest involved can be visualized as the student's
right to receive the most tangible evidence of university attendance - the
degrees and diplomas conferred by the state institution. These diplomas and
degrees can be seen as state "licenses" which will allow the student to obtain
further education, a larger lifetime earning power, or open the doors to
certain otherwise restricted occupations. "Statistics have established beyond
question the concrete value of all types of education both to the student and
to the economy. Moreover, any degree or diploma can reasonably be regarded
as a property interest. Though not a license required by law, they are
prerequisites in fact for many occupations. 71
Not only do students at state universities have a property interest in their
educations, but summary exclusion from higher education also arbitrarily
deprives students of a constitutionally protected interest in "liberty." Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis,72 a dismissed student might
have argued that her "interest in reputation alone"7 3 had been sufficiently
injured by the expulsion so that a constitutional interest in liberty had been
6'1d. at 570-71.
66 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
67419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
6 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code sec. 3345.011. The requirement of compulsory attendance found
at the elementary and secondary school levels is not present in public higher education,
however.69See also the expansive concept of property advocated in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L. J. 733 (1964).
70294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 930 (1961).71Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. Rv. 1045, 1153 (1968).
72 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
73 1d. at 4343.
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implicated. This argument would have proceeded upon the damage to the
student's future educational, professional, and social status due to the univer-
sity's stigmatization of him or her as an academic failure.7 4
The Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, however, rejected the aygument that
governmental stigmatization was by itself sufficient to bring due process
protections into play. The Paul Court held that the police's circulation of a
flyer to local merchants picturing petitioner as an "active shoplifter" did not
deprive the petitioner of a constitutionally protected interest in liberty, since
the stigmatization resulted in the alteration or extinguishment of no "right or
status previously recognized by state law. '
75
Paul v. Davis therefore apparently narrows the different theories which the
74 The Paul majority's insistence upon an "alteration of legal status," 44 U.S.L.W. at 4342
may now make claims of reputational injury or stigmatization by the dismissed student mere
surplusage. The Court seems to be saying that to establish a deprivation of liberty, a depriva-
tion of property ("alteration of legal status") must first be shown, but if a property interest can
be proven the establishment of a liberty interest is unnecessary to the student's cause of action.
"[I]nterest in reputation alone" deserves further mention, however, in light of the apparent
confusion of the Paul majority between the separate issues of whether reputation can be a
protectable liberty interest and whether insufficient process was afforded Paul in his particular
case so that 42 U.S.C. 1983 liability would lie. Mr. Justice Brennan sharply criticized the
majority on this point, predicting the opinion would be "a short-lived aberration." 44 U.S.L.W.
at 4348, 4350.
If Mr. Justice Brennan's prediction proves correct and injury to reputation alone is in the
future held to be constitutionally protected in some circumstances, students should be among
the first to receive the benefit of such protection. For what has been said about dismissals for
disciplinary reasons is equally true of academic dismissals in today's highly competitive
educational market:
Now that admission to college is increasingly difficult, an expulsion from an institution of
higher education significantly reduces a student's chances of completing his educational
program. Even at the lower levels of education, where alternative schools must be made
available, a dismissal from one school may force the student to complete his education at
an inferior institution. Furthermore, the dismissal always remains a part of his educa-
tional record. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045,
1154 (1968).
Since an academic dismissal remains part of a student's educational record, educational
opportunities may be foreclosed at many more schools or universities than the one from which
the student was actually dismissed. One purpose of the "Dean's Letter" required by many
graduate and professional schools is to ascertain whether the student has ever been disciplined
for academic or non-academic reasons. OFFICE OF CAREER SERVICES AND OFF-CAmpus LEARN-
ING, HARVARD UNIVERsrTy, LAW AND LAw-RELATED FIELDS 57 (4th ed. 1974). Since student
applications so greatly outnumber available openings in U.S. medical schools, it is the policy of
some medical schools never to admit a student who has previously been dropped from another
medical school for academic reasons. E.g., the University of Iowa College of Medicine-
appellant's brief in Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 9, 51 (8th Cir. 1975); the Harvard Medical
School-conversation November 26, 1975 with John Cantrell of the Harvard Medical School
Admissions Office.
An academic dismissal can also plague students once they leave the educational system;
consider the reluctance of many people to go to a doctor or lawyer who had once been dismissed
from medical or law school. The relevation of such dismissals is also both required and
considered relevant to the admission to the practice of law in many states. See, e.g., question
number seven on the Application for Registration as a Candidate for Admission to the Practice
of Law in Ohio (1975); question number twelve on the Application for Permission to Take the
Minnesota Bar Examination (1975).
7544 U.S.L.W. 4337, 4343 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
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dismissed student can plead in support of his claim for a dte process hearing.
The student will still be able to successfully establish that he has been
arbitrarily denied an interest in liberty, however, since the denial of contin-
ued attendance at the state university not only injures a student's "interest in
reputation alone,' 76 but must also be considered an "alteration of legal status"
within the terms of Paul. In fact, the Supreme Court in Paul dealt with this
issue directly by citing the student suspensions in Goss v. Lopez as involving
such an "alteration of legal status," since "[O]hio law conferred a right upon
all children to attend school, and ... the act of the school official suspending
the student there involved resulted in a denial or deprivation of that right. '77
Since students do, then, have both property and liberty interests in their
continued educations- interests which have been recognized in the context of
student expulsions for disciplinary reasons 78 - one must ask why these inter-
ests have not been protected by the courts when a student is dismissed from
school for academic reasons. In fact, many of the principal reasons for this
judicial abstention were also advanced in school disciplinary cases and re-
jected as invalid by such cases as Dixon and Goss.79
Academic dismissals involve an additional basis for judicial abstention
which is not present in the disciplinary dismissal cases, however, and that is
the feeling that the decision to dismiss a student for academic reasons is an
exercise of "academic expertise" that is not present in the decision to dismiss a
student for misconduct. "In the nature of the educational process, teachers
are more expert than students in assessing academic performance in the
classroom and it is their function to judge this performance, not a rationaliza-
tion of it in a hearing." 0
Professor Charles Allen Wright, while arguing for due process hearings
prior to student disciplinary dismissals, nevertheless believes that dismissals
for alleged academic deficiency are another matter:
[I]f the dean of students and the president are subject to being second-guessed by
the court on their administrative decisions, why is the faculty member left
undisturbed when he grades bluebooks or makes similar academic judgements. A
partial answer is that courts are expert in applying the first amendment and the
due process clause, but the persons on campus are the experts in deciding the
academic value of a particular piece of work.8'
Any arguments based on academic expertise, however, are premissed on a
misconception of the thesis of this article, which is to require the schools
themselves to grant students predismissal hearings. Since this article advo-
cates no increased vigilance on the part of the courts in reviewing the actual
76See note 74, supra.
7744 U.S.L.W. 4337, 4342 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
78See, text accompanying notes 46-63, supra.
79 Such reasons include the now-discredited notion of a right/privilege distinction within the
due process clause and the belief that schools must be totally autonomous in "internal affairs"
such as student dismissals.
"°Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAiv. L. REv. 1045, 1139 (1968).
81 Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1070 (1969).
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substance of grades given, the requirement of a school due process hearing
results in no substantial "judicial intervention" into the operation of the
public schools. Such a judicial holding as called for in this article would
merely require the schools to bring their own academic expertise to play in
determining whether or not a student should remain in academic good
standing at that university. 2
It is thus the very recognition of academic expertise which should lead
courts to require hearings prior to academic expulsions. The decision of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sindermann v. Perry expressed this same
view in its consideration of the right of teachers to a due process hearing prior
to dismissal from a state university:
School-constituted review bodies are the most appropriate forums for initially
determining issues of this type, both for the convenience of the parties and in
order to bring academic expertise to bear in resolving the nice issues of adminis-
trative discipline, teacher competence and school policy, which so frequently must
be balanced in reaching a proper determination.83
Thus in requiring hearings prior to academic dismissals the courts will
have remained within their own field of expertise (the enunciation and
protection of procedural rights), the schools will be required to exercise their
expertise in academics, and students' constitutional rights will be preserved.
One final argument which might be advanced against requiring hearings
prior to academic expulsions from the public schools is that the nature of the
issues at stake in such decisions -the fact that there may not be an underly-
ing "factual dispute" as in the case of a disciplinary dismissal -makes such a
hearing requirement meaningless in actual practice. This argument, how-
ever, is one which is actually addressed to the contours of any predismissal
82 Although this article does not advocate a more active judicial intervention into the merits
of individual dismissals, there may be rare occasions when the remedy for the constitutional
inadequacy of school dismissal procedures should be a judicial decision on the merits of the
expulsion rather than a remand for another school hearing. Such a possibility is suggested by
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.Cir. 1969),
where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit itself denied an applica-
tion for a television license renewal rather than remand for a procedurally correct renewal
hearing (although the current licensee was allowed to reapply for the license in the less-
advantageous position of a new applicant). Judges McGowan and Tamm explained then Judge
Burger's opinion in the case as holding "[t]hat the proceedings on [the first] remand had been
hopelessly bungled and that the public interest was best served by taking note of the early
expiration date [of the current license] and getting on with a new hearing in which the
Commission can decide who is best qualified to have this channel." Statement of Judges
McGowan and Tamm accompanying vote to deny the petition of the FCC for rehearing en banc.
Id. at 551.
Such administrative hostility to students' procedural due process rights could also lead
courts to reinstate students directly rather than go through the further delay of a second school
hearing. This analysis, of course, hypothesizes both an initial school dismissal hearing and
gross incompetence or bad faith on the part of the school authorities at that hearing. See
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 494 (1971) (Oakes, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972), for another example of a suggested reversal of adminis-
trative action without remand for further hearing.
430 F.2d 939, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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hearing, rather than to the question of whether there are protectable prop-
erty or liberty interests at stake. The argument will therefore be discussed in
a latter portion of this article.84 It should be noted here briefly, though, that
there often may indeed be underlying factual disputes (a student may not
accept the grade he has been given) and that such a hearing can also provide
the student an opportunity to "characterize his conduct '85 in an attempt to
convince the school that a sanction less drastic than unconditional dismissal
may be appropriate.
Student Due Process Rights in Other Public School Decisions
If a court does one day require public school authorities to hold due process
hearings prior to dismissal of students from the school for academic deficien-
cies, will the way then be open for judicial intervention into other aspects of
public school evaluation of students? Since this may be a real concern of
courts faced with the possibility of requiring a hearing prior to academic
dismissal, it should be made quite clear that the argument advanced in this
article does not extend beyond the specific fact situation discussed in the
article and that the requirement of a hearing prior to academic dismissal
would not signal entry into a new judicial "thicket" with no logically discerni-
ble boundaries.8 6
It should initially be stressed that a court holding adopting the argument of
this article as to predismissal hearings would not compel courts to become
involved in the normal award of classroom grades which are not the basis for
a student's expulsion from the public institution. Although the receipt of a
"B" rather than an "A" in a course could have a severe impact upon a
particular student, the student has not lost the property right in his or her
continued public education for which this article urges judicial protection.
- Pp. 293-95, 297-98, and note 122, infra.
nGoss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975). 'This opportunity [to be heard] is no less important
when, as here, there is not a serious dispute over the factual basis for the charge, for' ...
things are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at least have the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context."' Strickland v. Inlow,
519 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1975), quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
In another school disciplinary case in which the disciplinary infractions were admitted by
the student, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that due process may also
guarantee the student a hearing to argue for mitigation of punishment. Betts v. Board of
Education, 466 F .2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972) (dictum). See also pp. 293-95, 297-98, and note 122,
infra.
86 The analysis of this article would, however, extend to academic suspensions of students
that are not de minimus in nature. See the disciplinary suspension cases collected in Goss v.
Lopez, which itself dealt with disciplinary suspensions rather than expulsions. 419 U.S. 565,
576 n. 8 (1975). This article focuses on academic dismissals rather than suspensions because the
few court challenges to academic evaluation have involved dismissals, see pp. 279-83, supra,
and because the greater harm to students from dismissals makes legal change more necessary
in that area.
Academic probations may also call for at least some of the protections advocated in this
article if the "probation" is in effect a suspension or results in the immediate loss of academic
rights. Challenges to probations which only create the possibility of major sanctions in the
event of future student failings can perhaps best be postponed until the school actually moves
to suspend or dismiss the student. See note 120, infra, for the conflicting views of two U.S.
Courts of Appeal on the use of a dismissal hearing to challenge prior school demerits or
probation.
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Another fear which courts might have about this article's analysis is that it
could lead to the requirement of hearings prior to the denial of admission to
public schools and universities. Such a requirement does not necessarily
follow from the argument advanced here, since a student's loss from expul-
sion will usually be much greater than the loss occasioned by the denial of
initial entry into the school or university. Denial of admission could therefore
be constitutionally classified as a de minimus deprivation, and thus outside
the protections of the due process clause, by any court which desired to protect
students from academic dismissals, yet did not wish to mandate across-the-
board preadmission hearings.8 7
Furthermore, since the denial of admission should not prejudice later
applications for admission to that school or other schools as the dismissal from
school may, the liberty interest of the student will generally not be impaired
to the same extent as in the case of expulsion. State statutes or rules also
sometimes specifically allow state institutions to establish selective admis-
sions criteria, s which, indeed, many institutions of higher education are
forced to rely on today due to the larger number of applicants for admission
than positions available within the school.
Hearings concerning the much more limited and focused issues at stake
prior to dismissal would also most likely result in those hearings being of
much greater benefit to the student than a hearing on admission could ever
hope to be. Finally, although the administrative and economic burdens which
hearing requirements impose upon the state should generally have no bear-
ing on whether or not a person must receive a due process hearing,8 9 the
number of preadmission hearings which students could demand would be
tremendous and would result in the diversion of sorely-needed educational
funds from educational to administrative functions. 90
87 "[i] would draw a distinction between cases in which government is seeking to take action
against the citizen from those in which it is simply denying a citizen's request." Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 1267, 1295 (1975). It is important to note that Judge
Friendly is not here merely invoking the now-discredited right/privilege distinction. Id. But see
Gelhorn & Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Procedures and Standards-
Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. REV. 975 (1974).
"'See, e.g., OHmO REV. CODE sec. 3345.06.
9 "[O]ne might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy govern-
ment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
656 (1972). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973); Note: Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 1510 (1975). But cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring
in part); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971); Friendly, supra note 87.
' Medical and law schools would perhaps be the most inconvenienced by any requirement
that rejected applicants could demand due process hearings, since only one-third of the nation's
annual applicants to medical schools are accepted and in 1973 85,999 applicants competed for
the 37,018 first-year openings in United States law schools. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL
COLLEGES, MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS: 1976-77 17 (1975); White, Is that
Burgeoning Law School Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A.J. 202, 203 (1975).
Under such a requirement the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Medicine
would have been required to offer due process hearings to 5000 rejected applicants in choosing
its 1974-75 entering class of 135, and the University of California at Davis Law School would
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Public schools should therefore not be required to follow any specific
procedures in the selection of their initial student body, so long as the
admissions' decisions are not based upon impermissible criteria such as race
or sex.
91
The reach of the logic of this article should also not extend into the public
elementary and secondary schools, since academic failure at that stage usu-
ally does not deprive a student of the right to continue his education or
stigmatize the student so as to deprive him of so many future opportunities
that a constitutional liberty is implicated. The traditional judicial noninter-
ference in the elementary and secondary school promotional decision 92 should
therefore not be affected by the reasoning expressed here.
The rights to notice and hearing advocated in this article should thus be
seen not only as rights which follow naturally from constitutional law prece-
dent, but also as rights which would not precipitate any wholesale judicial
intervention into other areas of life in the public schools. Mr. Justice Powell's
criticism of the Goss decision, that it is "difficult to perceive any principled
limit to the new reach of procedural due process,' 9 3 is therefore inapplicable to
the legal rule advocated in this article.
What Process Is Due?94
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what
process is due?"9 5 After an interest has been found to be a "liberty" or
"property" interest for the purposes of the due process clause, the courts must
still determine the procedures appropriate to protect that right. This second
stage of the due process analysis is necessary, since, as the Supreme Court
noted in Goss v. Lopez, "[t]he interpretation and application of the Due
Process Clause are intensely practical matters and. .. 'the very nature of due
have been required to offer 1700 hearings to choose its 1975-76 first-year class of 160 students.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, supra, at 227; ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS & THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, PRE-LAw HANDBOOK 210-11 (1975).
9 For a recent case in which public school admissions policies were challenged as both
racially and sexually discriminatory see Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 501
F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974), noted in 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 930 (1975).
92See, e.g., Pittman v. Board of Education, 56 Misc. 2d 51, 287 N.Y.S. 2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
See also Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 378
(1969) for a comparison of the rights of secondary school students and students in higher
education.
"3 419 U.S. at 600.
4 Although this section of the paper deals only with rights constitutionally mandated by the
due process clause, it is important to keep in mind "the rule of law that an organization may
create procedural rights in addition to the constitutional minimum where its own rules
prescribe the additional safeguards." Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals,
375 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (N.D. Tex. 1974). See also Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954);
Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
For discussions of the specific requisites of due process in the school disciplinary context see
KnP & YUDOF, supra note 10, at 195-97; the bibliography on student rights in HOGAN, supra
note 10; Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. LA. Rlv. 545 (1971).
95 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.' 9 6
Since the requirements of due process in the school dismissal decision may
differ from the requisites of due process in other situations, and, indeed, the
necessary procedures will even differ among different dismissal decisions, no
single list of required procedures can adequately cover all instances of aca-
demic dismissal. Instead, courts should require those procedures which are
functionally necessary for the presentation of each particular case,9 7 basing
decisions as to functional necessity upon the purposes the due process clause
is thought to serve. The most often cited purposes of the requirement of
governmental due process are three:9g(1) to ensure that the governmental
decision-markers are proceeding upon a correct determination of the underly-
ing facts; (2) to provide a basis for later judicial review of the administrative
decision; and (3) "to legitimize the actions of government by generating the
feeling that just procedures have been followed, even though the individual
may disagree with the government's final decision." 99
In the academic dismissal decision, there is rarely the underlying factual
dispute which often is given as the main practical reason for a due process
hearing. Academic dismissals therefore differ from school disciplinary situa-
tions, for which Dixon and Goss have attempted to provide procedures to
prevent decisions based upon a mistaken view of the underlying facts. Thus,
if resolution of an underlying factual dispute is seen as the only basis for the
invocation of the protections of the due process clause, there would be a very
minimal hearing necessary in many academic dismissal situations. 100
; 419 U.S. at 578, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).97 For discussions of a functional approach to due process procedures see Note: Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 1510 (1975); Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972); Davis, The
Requirement of a Trial-Type-Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1956). This paper, however, goes
beyond advocacy of only those procedures functionally necessary to ensure an accurate admin-
istrative decision. See the discussion of the other purposes of the due process clause starting on
this page.
03 Note: Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HARY. L. REV. 1510, 1540 (1975). See also Mr. Justice Harlan's "three
criteria by which the procedural requirements of due process should be measured." In Re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). These criteria are: "[F]irst, no more
restrictions should be imposed than are imperative to assure the proceedings' fundamental
fairness; second, the restrictions which are imposed should be those which preserve, so far as
possible, the essential elements of the State's purpose; and finally, restrictions should be
chosen which will later permit the orderly selection of any additional protections which may
ultimately prove necessary." Id. at 72.
Roger Cramton has also suggested three criteria for evaluating due process procedures,
which are accuracy, efficiency (cost and burden) and acceptability of the decision-making
process. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in NuclearPowerPlant Siting, 58 VA. L.
Rev. 585, 591-93 (1972).
99Note: Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. Rv. 1510, 1540 (1975).
100 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th
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The second major rationale for the requirement of a hearing, that of
furnishing a basis for later judicial review, provides a stronger argument for
requiring a fuller predismissal hearing. Since courts do review academic
dismissal decisions to ascertain whether the official action was arbitrary,
capricious or in bad faith,10 1 the scope and procedures of any hearing should
be further expanded to facilitate this review and save the courts from having
to hold their own factual hearings on the bases for the failing grade. One
commentator has explained the Dixon decision in terms of this saving of
judicial resources: "To avoid the necessity of holding federal trials in every
school expulsion, the [Dixon] court held that due process attached to the
student's interest in education and that notice, hearing, and statement of
reasons were required before expulsion.""1 2
The third rationale for due process hearings-that of legitimation of the
governmental decision-making-has been described by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in the following terms:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by
which it was reached... No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating
the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done. 103
This "fairness" rationale for due process protection seems particularly
appropriate in the area of public school dismissal decisions, if, as Mr. Justice
Jackson has warned, "[w]e are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes."' 4 It is anomalous that in a system which stresses teacher-
student communication as our educational system does, a student can be
summarily dismissed from school without having any input into the dismissal
decision or even knowing why he or she has failed. As one textbook on
evaluation of pupil progress has said, "The main reason for reporting to pupils
and parents is to facilitate the learning and development of the pupils."'0 5 Mr.
Justice White's comment in Goss upon the value of communication in the
school disciplinary process could also be paraphrased so as to apply in the case
of academic dismissal: [I]t would be a strange [grading] system in an
Cir. 1972) has stated in the context of a school disciplinary case that the absence of an
underlying factual dispute may affect the procedures constitutionally required at a due process
hearing. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a similar sentiment in requiring more
than informal hearing procedures in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961): "By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed
to a failure to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a collection of the facts
concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses."
101 Connelly, 244 F.Supp. at 161.
102 McCormack, The Purpose ofDue Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for Judicial Review?, 52
TEXAs L. REV. 1257, 1288 (1974).
103 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
104 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
10 Gronlund, Measurement and Evaluation in Teaching 480 (1971). See also Ahmann &
Glock, Evaluating Pupil Growth 495-538 (1971).
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educational institution if no communication was sought by the [teacher] with
the student in an effort to inform him of his defalcation and to let him tell his
side of the story in order to make sure that an injustice is not done."10 6
With these three main purposes of the due process clause in mind, and
recognizing that no one set of procedures will be appropriate for all school
dismissal decisions, specific procedural elements which have been required or
requested in other due process hearings will now be considered and a determi-
nation will be made as to whether these procedures should be required in
academic dismissal situations. 10 7
Notice
Since due process is often described as notice and opportunity to be heard, 0 8
it is appropriate to begin the formulation of the dimensions of a predismissal
hearing by a consideration of these elements of due process. Kenneth Culp
Davis has said that "[t]he key to ... notice in the administrative process is
adequate opportunity to prepare. , ,19 The notice must thus be sufficient
both in terms of a detailed statement of the "charges" that the school authori-
ties will proceed upon at the hearing and must be received by the student in
sufficient time to allow him opportunity to prepare arguments and gather
materials or witnesses to present at the hearing.
The determination of whether or not a notice is "adequate" in either
particularity or timing cannot be abstractly decided apart from the particular
facts of the dismissal situation."10 As for the contents of such notice, in the
usual school dismissal situation there will normally be little more to tell the
student than that he or she has received a specific grade and therefore stands
'c0419 U.S. at 580. One commentator on the Goss decision has said that, "The student's
opportunity to confront the disciplinarian, guaranteed by Goss, not only is a minimum
safeguard to factual accuracy, but is part of the process of education itself." Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 269, 313 n. 128 (1975).
Others have suggested that this "fairness" rationale for procedural due process has become
especially important in today's bureaucratic society. "By asking to hear from litigants and
listening to them, the 'system' is treating them with a dignity consonant with their self-image
as human beings; each is important, and each has some measure of control over his own
destiny. One can thus explain the need for notice and the right to be heard on humanizing
grounds, even if the facts are known and the law clear." Surbin & Dykstra, Notice and the
Right to be Heard: the Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LAB. L. REv. 449,
457 (1974).
107 The specific procedures considered follow the "elements of a fair hearing" set forth in
Friendly, supra note 87, at 1279-95.
108 "For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified."' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting
Baldwin v. Hiale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1863).
1191 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE sec. 8.05 at 530 (1958).
0 "Line drawing on the question whether a complaint or other notice fails adequately to
particularize is done in close cases on the basis of an entire record." 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 109,
at sec. 8.05, 531. "'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commit-
tee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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in jeopardy of being dismissed from the school, and to inform the student of
the school's appeal procedure and contours of the hearing which will be held
upon the student's request.
If the threatened dismissal is predicated upon matters other than perform-
ance on written examinations, the student's right to know the evidence
against him' means that the notice will have to be somewhat more specific
and set out these additional bases of evaluation. For example, if a medical
school's proposed dismissal of a student is based upon adverse clinical evalua-
tions of the student, the student should be shown these evaluations in
advance of the hearing. Since such evaluations are required to be made
available to all students under the "Buckley Amendment" to the General
Education Provisions Act of 1974,112 this additional notice requirement should
not prove burdensome for schools to comply with.
The timing of the notice presents more difficult problems. Must the notice
come only soon enough to give the student adequate time to prepare for the
final dismissal hearing, or should the student receive notice at an earlier time
in the school term so that she may take action to prevent even the initial
entry of a failing grade against her? While it may be sound educational policy
to notify students of any impending academic difficulties, and many schools
in fact do sO," 3 the fifth and fourteenth amendments merely require that
notice precede the due procee hearing itself. Thus, although a student's
dismissal may be attributable to the failure of many individual examinations
or courses during the term, the constitutionally mandated notice and hearing
need only be given at the end of the term prior to the final decision to dismiss
the student." 4
Ability to Present Reasons Why the Proposed Action Should Not Be Taken
The ability to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken
is merely another way of stating the requirement that there be a predismissal
hearing on the student's alleged academic deficiency. Thus all but one of the
courts which have considered allegedly bad faith or capricious academic
school dismissals have required the schools to allow the student a chance to
111 'There can ... be no fair dispute over the right to know the nature of the evidence on
which the administrator relies." Friendly, supra note 87, at 1283. See also pp. 301-02, infra.
"'20 U.S.C.A. sec. 1232g.
13 Conversation of November 26, 1975 with Noreen Koller, Registrar of the Harvard Medical
School as to that school's advance notice policy; conversation of January 28, 1976 with Mildred
Healy, Registrar of the College of Arts and Sciences of Tufts University as to that school's
policy of predismissal counseling and academic probation.
114'The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage or at any
particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the
requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective." Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
This hearing must be held prior to the final determination as to dismissal and its terms,
however, since "It is... fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting Armstrong v. Manso, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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present his or her side of the matter'1 5-to "characterize his conduct and put it
in what he deems the proper context." 116 Such a right to a hearing is indeed
essential if due process is to affect the quality and correctness of the decision
reached by the school authorities.
Although it can be stated unequivocally that such an opportunity to be
heard must be provided, 117 the scope of the issues to be considered at such a
hearing is a more troubling problem. A student's dismissal may be based
upon the failures of many separate examinations over the course of the term
and a student may desire to challenge decisions as to the correctness of many
individual examination answers. This should not be the usual situation,
however, and in the case of objections to individual objective questions the
challenges should not be too time-consuming to resolve. Challenges to subjec-
tive examinations will take longer to dispose of, but it is in these subjective
evaluations that any capriciousness or bad faith on the part of the professor is
most likely to manifest itself."" A student should therefore be able to chal-
lenge any academic decisions which are "proximately related ' 9 to the stu-
dent's threatened failure, interpreting that term broadly so as to preserve the
maximum possible challenges for the student. 20
The hearing must also provide the student with the right to bring forth any
extenuating circumstances to excuse or explain an admitted academic fail-
ure. This latter right of explanation may be, in fact, the one which students
will most frequently avail themselves of at such hearings, deciding not to
challenge the underlying evaluations received, but merely to "characterize
"' The only court in the academic dismissal cases discussed earlier which refused to allow
the student involved an opportunity to be heard (despite a holding that the due process clause
was applicable to.the situation) is Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975): "All that
is required is that the student be made aware prior to termination of his failure or impending
failure to meet those standards."
116 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
"17 See note 108, supra.
",8 Student evaluations are especially subjective in today's medical schools, where clinical
work composes the bulk of the student's courses after the first two years. Conversation of
November 26, 1975 with Noreen Koller, Registrar of the Harvard Medical School. The plaintiff
in Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975) was evaluated upon such factors as his
relationship to others, attendance, attitude, appearance, initiative, fund of knowledge and
dependability. Appellant's brief in Greenhill v. Bailey, Id. at 16-17. The medical student in
Lukacs v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, No. 74 CV 109-C (W.D. Mo. July 23, 1974) was also
evaluated on the basis of his "attitude." Lukacs, supra, at pp. 5-6.
'gSee PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236-290 (1971).
'2 One such holding in the school disciplinary area is Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201,
211 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that-although the receipt
of individual demerits need not be preceded by due process hearings-when a cadet was
threatened with dismissal from West Point due to the cumulative total of such demerits, the
student was constitutionally entitled to a due process hearing at which the factual basis of
earlier demerits could be challenged. But see Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1973),
where the court held in the context of a student's disciplinary dismissal predicated in part upon
prior disciplinary infractions, "The fact that the total of all infractions may aggravate the
ultimate penalty does not require the courts to go back into prior events and proceedings
which, when they took place, were not such as to constitute an aggrievement in the constitu-
tional sense." Id. at 824.
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[their] conduct"1 21 and request a sanction less drastic than expulsion.122 A
student whose failure stems from illness or family emergency might success-
fully use such a hearing to convince school authorities to allow him or her to
retake the failed courses or examinations, do other remedial or make-up
work, or at least be permitted to petition for later readmission.
Right to an Unbiased Tribunal
The right to an unbiased tribunal has been perceived by some courts as of
less importance than many of the other procedural elements often associated
with due process hearings, on the theory that later court review can correct
any irregularities or abuses at the hearing. 123 As one commentator has said
in the context of the dismissal of employees from government jobs, "'The biased
employer can build a record for review as easily as an unbiased employer so
long as procedural due process is afforded, assuming that procedural due
process includes separation of functions and protection against personal
animosity to ensure that reasons not in the record do not result in dis-
missal."1 24
Such a rationale, however, is contrary to two of the three main purposes of
the due process clause, those of assuring a fair and accurate administrative
decision and of assuring the person involved that he has been fairly treated by
the governmental authority. 125 Especially in the area of school dismissal
decisions, where later court review is so narrowly limited, 126 the due process
121 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
122 Explanation by the student of his problem and discussion of the proper course of action for
the student-whether dismissal with or without the possibility of later readmittance, a retake
of the failed courses, or the possibility of taking any failed examinations a second time-is now
the usual occurrence when such hearings are held at the Harvard Law School and Harvard
Medical School. Conversation of November 26, 1975 with Mary Upton, Registrar of the Harvard
Law School; conversation of November 26, 1975 with Noreen Koller, Registrar of the Harvard
Medical School.
Two U.S. Courts of Appeal have specifically recognized the value of a due process hearing in
allowing a student threatened with disciplinary dismissal to make arguments as to mitigation
of punishment. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972); Betts v. Board of Educ.,
466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972) (dictum).
Commentators have also recognized that-despite the undisputed nature of the underlying
facts-"[plermitting a party to speak also gives him an opportunity to bring himself within one
of the exceptions that accompany any legal rule, or to draw distinctions, or to articulate a new
exception. Hearing both sides allows, and probably encourages, refinement of the law, and
even outright change. Further, the physical presence of a litigant or the totality of his story
may be influential in more subtle ways. It may be more difficult for a judge to cause harm to
people who are present; they are no longer merely names or numbers." Subrin & Dykstra,
supra note 106, at 454. See also Tribe, supra note 106, on the constitutional need for individual-
ized hearings rather than reliance on fixed rules to settle certain disputes, and note 85, supra.
123 McCormack, supra note 102, at 1259.
124 McCormack, supra note 102, at 1286.
'2' See pp. 292-95, supra, for a discussion of the three major purposes of the due process
clause.
126 The standard of review in Connelly, 244 F.Supp. at 161, is whether the school acted
"arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith," the student's remedy for such proscribed action being
a due process hearing.
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clause will be gutted of much of its meaning if schools are permitted to hold
due process hearings before a biased individual or group of individuals.
In concrete terms, the requirement of an unbiased decision-maker in school
dismissal decisions should mean that the person to whom the student brings
his or her appeal is someone other than the person who originally gave the
student the failing mark which is the basis for the proposed dismissal. Thus
in Warren v. National Association of Secondary School Principials127 the
court ordered a new hearing to be held on a student's dismissal from the
National Honor Society because, although there was no dispute as to the
underlying conduct which constituted the basis for the student's dismissal,
the teacher who had witnessed and testified concerning the student conduct
also sat as a judge on the faculty council which decided to dismiss the student
from the Honor Society. The Warren court felt that the student had not
received a fair hearing since his chances to obtain more lenient punishment
from the faculty council were threatened by the dual role of the teacher as
prosecutor and judge. Such is also the case when a professor's academic
evaluation of a student is challenged: the professor would much rather see her
initial evaluation upheld rather than have to admit that that decision was in
any way arbitrary or in bad faith. 128
Although in one case involving a vocational school failure the school
system granted the student the chance to appear before the town's school
board, 129 the Constitution does not require a hearing so removed from the
school setting. A hearing before a panel of disinterested teachers and school
administrators would seem to strike an acceptable balance between the right
of the student to an impartial arbitrator and the school's interest in keeping
the expense and inconvenience of such hearings to a minimum. Many colleges
and universities in fact have just such "promotion committees" to decide
questions of student academic standing, 130 and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently upheld such a faculty and administrative committee against
a charge of bias in a student disciplinary dismissal:
The argument is made that the committee and the Dean were not disinterested
persons, but school disciplinary problems must first be resolved in the school and
by its constituted authorities. This is a function of the educational process and has
17 375 F.Supp. 1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
'Is"[Tihis natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is
not yet fully known," is given by Lon Fuller as the reason for our legal system's preference for
an adversarial case presentation instead of an inquisitorial system in which the roles of
prosecutor and judge are merged. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AmERCAN LAW
35, 45 (H. Berman ed. 1972). Empirical support for Fuller's thesis that the results under an
adversarial system may differ from those under an inquisitorial system is offered by Thibaut,
Walker & Lind, Comment: Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86
HAav. L. REV. 386 (1972).
"7Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1975).
"' Such committees are especially prevalent in medical schools and are used at the medical
schools of the Universities of Iowa, Vermont, and Missouri-Columbia and Harvard University.
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 6 (8th Cir. 1975); Connelly, 244 F.Supp. at 158; Lukacs v.
Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, No. 74 CV 109-C, 2 (W.D. Mo. July 23, 1974); conversation of
November 26, 1975 with Noreen Koller, Registrar of the Harvard Medical School.
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always been considered a basic element. The student places himself in the school
community and traditionally those with immediate supervision plus one or more
in an administrative position, or combined position, enforce the rules of discipline.
This has to be the starting point at least.
131
Right to Call Witnesses
The right to call witnesses to help the student present her case was one
procedural due process element which the Supreme Court refused to require
in Goss v. Lopez. 132 The Supreme Court's rationale for refusing to mandate
this and several other procedures 133 was that since "[b]rief disciplinary sus-
pensions are almost countless,' 3 4 "[t]o impose in each such case even trun-
cated trial type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities in
many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in
educational effectiveness." 35 In contrast to brief disciplinary suspensions,
however, dismissals for academic reasons are not "almost countless" and
therefore this rationale of the Court is inapplicable to such academic dis-
missals.
3 6
An even stronger reason for rejection of this rationale in the context of
academic failures, however, is that the sanction of dismissal is a much graver
consequence for the student involved than that of a suspension from junior or
senior high school for ten days or less. Due to the lack of an underlying
factual controversy in many academic dismissal situations, the witnesses
actually called should be few"37 (often perhaps only a witness or two to vouch
for good work in other courses or to verify extenuating circumstances) and the
administrative burden upon the schools thus minimal. Indeed, even in school
disciplinary situations, where disputed factual issues may mean that large
numbers of witnesses will actually be called, many courts have upheld
131 Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 625-26 (10th Cir. 1975).
13419 U.S. at 583.
I- The other procedures the Supreme Court rejected were the rights to counsel, confronta-
tion, and cross-examination. Id. at 583 (1975).
1341d.
135Id"
i3 Although there are no national statistics on the number of students dismissed for
academic reasons from American institutions of higher education, the nation's medical schools
graduate ninety-five percent of their original entering classes and the attrition rate from all
causes in the first year of law school averages less than ten percent. ASSOCIATON OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES, supra note 90, at 45; OFFICE OF CAREER-SERVICES AND OFF-CAmnus LEARN-
ING, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note 74, at 28. These figures contrast with the statistics
submitted to the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that in the 1972-73 school
year there were 4000 short-term suspensions in the Cincinatti public school system and almost
15,000 short-term suspensions in the Cleveland public school system. Brief for Buckeye
Association of School Administrators as Amicus Curiae at 2 in Goss.
137 Thus in two of the academic dismissal cases discussed previously, pp. 279-83, supra, the
student involved called no witnesses in his or her behalf, although granted that right by their
schools. Lukacs v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, No. 74 CV 109-C, 4 n. 1 (W.D. Mo. July 23,
1974); Gaspar v. Bruten, 513 F.2d 843, 848 (10th Cir. 1975).
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students' rights to call any witnesses necessary to the presentation of their
cases.
138
Right to a Record of the Proceedings and a Statement of Reasons for the
Decision
Since one of the reasons for requiring a predismissal hearing is to provide a
basis for later judicial review of the school's action, 139 both a record and a
statement of reasons for the school's decision should be provided the dismissed
student. The record requirement could easily be met by allowing the student
to tape-record the hearing, 140 while the reasons for the dismissal decision
need not be lengthy and seem to be the least that the student is entitled to.
Right to Have the Decision Based Only Upon the Evidence Presented
The requirement that the school's decision be based only on the evidence
presented at the dismissal hearing is a necessity if the other due process
rights granted the student are to be meaningful. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently made exactly this observation in a student disciplinary case:
"The plaintiffs were not given notice of this second charge. Ignorant of the
scope of the matter under consideration, the plaintiffs' opportunity to present
their side of the case was rendered meaningless.' 141 Since the "Buckley
Amendment" to the General Education Provisions Act of 1974142 has now
granted students access to their school files, revealing to students the under-
lying bases of their proposed dismissals should not unreasonably burden
schools or universities.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Strickland v. Inlow 43 also
suggests an additional restriction on the evidence presented at a school
dismissal hearing. In Strickland the Court of Appeals found that there had
not been any evidence of the alleged disciplinary violation introduced at the
challenged disciplinary hearing and held that the students' rights to substan-
tive due process required the introduction of at least some evidence in support
13 Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807
(2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F.Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
"9 See pp. 293-94, supra, and McCormack, supra note 102.
'4 This suggestion of allowing the proceedings to be tape recorded has been made in Abbott,
supra note 92, at 398, and such a tape recording of the school hearing was actually made and
reviewed by the federal district court in Lukacs v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, No. 74 CV
109-C (W.D. Mo. July 23, 1974).
See also Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967),
where the court specified as one of the requisites of due process in a school disciplinary
proceeding the opportunity for either side to make a record of the hearing at their own expense.
141 Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 747 (8th Cir. 1975).
14220 U.S.C.A. sec. 1232g.
1- 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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of the school's position at the hearing. 1 4 4 Such a requirement is also necessary
to protect the usefulness of academic dismissal hearings and, as with the
requirement that the school decide only upon the evidence actually presented
at the hearing, the requirement should not be burdensome to comply with.
Right to Counsel
The student's right to counsel is one of the most frequently litigated issues
in the area of school disciplinary hearings today. 145 Some commentators have
been very enthusiastic about the benefits to be gained by the presence of
counsel at disciplinary hearings: "The potential benefits of counsel seem so
indisputable that denying the right to counsel should be presumed to disad-
vantage the student.' 1 46 Others have also been skeptical of the legitimacy of
school interests said to outweigh the student's need for counsel: "The only
colorable Administration interests in limiting counsel can be the fear of
publicity harmful to it or the student, undue stress on legal technicality, or
overly extensive attack on it by a lawyer unfeeling for the Administration's
problems. These are not nearly justification to deny free choice of counsel to a
student literally fighting for his academic life." 147
Both of the "landmark" cases in the school disciplinary area, Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ. 148 and Goss v. Lopez, 49 have rejected such a
requirement of counsel, however. It seems especially questionable whether
an attorney will be (1) very helpful to all students facing academic dismissal,
in light of the usual lack of an underlying factual dispute and absence of the
strict procedural and evidentiary technicalities of the courtroom, or (2) condu-
cive to the academic communication and discourse which should prevail at
such an academic hearing. 50
144 Id. at 190. The Supreme Court did not reach this issue in its decision. Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 323-26 (1975). See also General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education,
45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc), in which the United States Federal District Court
for the Western District of Missouri included the requirement "that no disciplinary action be
taken on grounds which are not supported by any substantial evidence," citing Thompson v.
City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
4
'See Buss, supra note 94, at 603-15. The arguments of proponents and opponents of a
student right to counsel at school disciplinary proceedings are well summarized in the district
court and court of appeals decisions in Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, rev'd 386
F.2d 778 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968), noted in 32 ALBANY L. REV. 467 (1968); 46
N.C.L. REV. 398 (1968); 14 N.Y.L.F. 171 (1968); 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 961 (1967); 22 RUTGERS L.
REv. 342 (1968); 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 107 (1967); 46 TExAS L. REV. 540 (1968). See also Esteban
v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), where right to
counsel was granted in a student disciplinary proceeding.
" Buss, supra note 94, at 612.
1 Ryan v. Hofstra University, 67 Misc. 2d 651, 673, 324 N.Y.S. 2d 964, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
148 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
149 419 U.S. at 583.
1-1 One commentator has questioned whether such an ideal academic communicative process
can ever exist at a school disciplinary hearing and therefore rejects arguments against counsel
based on attempts to 'preserve" such an atmosphere. "[M]uch would probably be gained by
giving the student the dignity and self-respect which would result from clearly drawing sides,
stating frankly that a serious matter is at issue, and indicating that the student must take
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With a proper explanation of procedures and rights beforehand, and a tape
of the proceedings to provide for meaningful judicial review, 151 the "funda-
mental fairness" of many dismissal hearings can be preserved without the
presence of an attorney. Although many schools do allow counsel to attend
academic dismissal hearings, 52 and there may be individual situations in
which counsel is necessary to allow the student to adequately "characterize
his conduct,"5 3 the fifth or fourteenth amendments do not mandate an across-
the-board right to counsel in all academic dismissal hearings.
Confrontration and Cross-Examination
The rights to confrontation and cross-examination are two other hotly
contested rights in school disciplinary cases 54 which were both rejected as
constitutionally mandated by Dixon and Goss.'5 5 Those who argue that the
right to cross-examination is essential to due process generally do so on the
theory of Professor Wigmore that cross-examination is "N[b]eyond any doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."'5 16 How-
ever, as has been mentioned previously in the discussion of the right to
counsel, 57 the differences existent at an academic dismissal hearing are
unlikely to involve disputed issues of fact. Thus the general relevance for
some responsibility for the outcome and will be given a fair opportunity to do so." Buss, supra
note 94, at 573.
Professor Laurence Tribe aims a similar cirticism at those who adopt a "fraternal" view of
school suspension or expulsion hearings. "[E]ven if in general the teacher's and child's interest
truly converge, at the moment of suspension convergence must surely turn into clash: the
teacher is saying that the best interests of other students will be served by this particular
student's suspension." Tribe, supra note 106, at 314 n. 128
'
51 See p. 37 and note 140, supra.
'
2 See, e.g., Lukacs v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, No. 74 CV 109-C, 8 (W.D. Mo. July
23, 1974). Counsel are also permitted to attend academic dismissal hearings at the Harvard
Law School. Conversation of November 26, 1975 with Mary Upton, Registrar of the Harvard
Law School.
'" Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. The Goss Supreme Court also recognized that unusual circumstan-
ces might demand fuller procedures than those specified in its opinion. Id. Such unusual
circumstances might include the presence at the hearing of an attorney representing the school
or an exclusionary hearing at the elementary or secondary school level of education where
counsel or other representative may be essential to the coherence of the student's presentation.
On this later point see Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972).
M4 See Buss, supra note 94, at 593-603 and cases collected therein.
1' The failure of the Goss majority to require such rights as confrontation, cross-examina-
tion, right to counsel and right to call witnesses have led some commentators to question the
real significance of the decision: "Goss' impact on educational practice shoild not be over-
estimated .... [T]he majority emphasized that notice and hearing need amount to little more
than informal student-administrator confrontation immediately after misconduct and immedi-
ately before suspension." The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 86 (1975). Another
commentator has said of Goss. "The student is guaranteed at least some type of informal
hearing, generally to take place prior to suspension; but this is the only 'guarantee' the student
possesses. This'guarantee' might very easily be reduced to a mere formality void of meaningful
due process protection." 3 FLA. STATE U.L. REv. 301, 308 (1975).
156 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAiS AT COMMON LAw sec. 1367, p. 32 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1974).
... Pp. 302-03, supra.
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such hearings of cross-examination in its courtroom sense is questionable,
although the student should certainly have the right to question all evalua-
tions concerning him as part of the "informal give-and-take"'158 of the proceed-
ings.
The right of confrontation is a right which schools have sometimes argued
is inapplicable to their proceedings because of their inability to subpoena
witnesses. 1 9 This argument has not, however, been held determinative by
all the courts which have considered the issue in the context of school
disciplinary hearings, 160 and such decisions are indeed correct, since the
teachers or professors involved are school employees and school subpoena
power should therefore be unnecessary.16 1 In Gaspar v. Bruton,'62 one of the
recent court challenges to academic dismissals, the public school involved had
itself granted the student the right to confront those upon whose evaluation
the proposed dismissal was based.' 63 Such a decision is both educationally
sound and constitutionally mandated, since any meaningful discussion of the
actual merits of the evaluation received must include the teacher's own
explanation of that evaluation. Thus students should have the right to
require the presence at the dismissal hearing of the teachers upon whose
evaluation the school has based its decision to dismiss the student.
Right of Appeal
The requirement of predismissal hearings at the schools themselves will
not in any way alter students' rights to challenge in the court dismissals
which are believed to be arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith. 64 However,
once predismissal hearings are uniformly mandated, students must avail
themselves of such hearings at their schools prior to resort to the courts. 65
This division of functions is as it should be, for, as mentioned previously, 66
the persons with the "academic expertise" will be making at least the initial
determinations of fact. By so doing the school officials should help keep to a
minimum the number of cases which the courts must hear and at the same
time provide a record for review in those cases which do eventually reach the
courts.
158 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
1'9 See, e.g., People v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 210, 134 N.E. 2d 635, 637 (1956);
State v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 215-16, 263 P. 433, 437, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1927).
"0 See, e.g., Fiedler v. Board of Educ. 346 F.Supp. 722, 730 (D. Neb. 1972).
161 "[T]eacher contracts might.., be used as a technical basis for overcoming the lack of
power to compell attendance of... teacher witnesses." Buss, supra note 94, at 597 n. 232.
1062 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed at p. 281, supra.
16 3 Id. at 846.
164 The standard for court review of academic dismissals established by Connelly, 244 F.
Supp. at 161.
'6 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); JAFFE, JUDIczAL
CONTROL OF AnalNIsrVaAivE AcTIoN 424-58 (1965); 3 K. Davis, supra note 109, at sec. 20.01-
20.10, pp. 56-115.
166 Pp. 288-89, supra.
Vol. 5, No. 3
HeinOnline  -- 5 J.L. & Educ. 304 1976
Student Due Process Rights in Academic Dismissals 305
A Concluding Comment Upon the Procedural Protections Required
Even if one believes that the courts should delineate very specific proce-
dural guidelines with which to resolve future cases,167 a court could never be
faced with the broad questions posed by this article as to whether there is ever
a constitutional requirement of hearing prior to academic dismissal and the
specific contours of any hearings which might be required. The preceding
discussion of particular due process procedures should therefore be taken as
the generalization that it is. For even the Goss Court-which lay down very
specific procedural requirements-recognized the possibility that the proce-
dures it mandated might have to be supplemented "in unusual situations. 1 6 8
The generalized approach of this section of the article was adopted because
of the difficulty in determining in the abstract what elements of due process
may be functionally necessary in any particular hearing. It is also impossible
to weigh in the abstract the seriousness of the consequences stemming from
dismissal at the various levels of public education. Although this difficulty of
abstract formulation of specific procedures remains, the approach adopted in
this article -that of giving the student the procedures functionally necessary
for the presentation of his case' 69-should leave all of the hearing's partici-
pants with a feeling that justice has been done.
Conclusion
In the fifteen years since the decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education1 70 the courts of this country have increasingly come to realize that
"However little courts may know about education or school discipline, they do
know about fact-finding, decisionmaking, fairness, and procedure" 17' and can
thus formulate procedural protections for students which will not compromise
the academic integrity or quality of our nation's public educational institu-
tions. "Times-and the law-have changed,' 72 and student due process
rights in academic dismissals -once labeled an "astonishing suggestion" by
Professor Charles Allen Wright-7 3 -must today be recognized as no less
constitutionally mandated than student due process rights in dismissals for
disciplinary reasons.
As educators themselves have stressed,
One of the purposes of colleges and universities is to seek the truth by objec-
167 Judge Friendly has criticized such detailed judicial codes. Friendly, supra note 87, at
1301-03. Professor Henry Monaghan has recently stressed that any such implementations of
constitutional provisions are subject to change and amendment by Congress. Monaghan,
Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975).
103 419 U.S. at 584.
169 See p. 27, supra.
170 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
'7' Buss, supra note 94, at 571.
'
72 Brief for the Children's Defense Fund and American Friends Service Committee as amici
curiae at 19 in Goss.
173 Wright, supra note 81, at 1069.
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tively weighing all the evidence before an evaluation is made. This is no more or
less than is required by the concept of due process. Certainly if ideas are worthy of
due process, then individual students should be worthy of the same. Anything less
is antithetical to the purpose and aim of higher education. 17 4
Anything less is also unconstitutional under the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
' Young & Gehring, The Other Side of the Coin: Due Process in Academic Affairs, 1
NOLPE SCHOOL L. J. 32, 37 (Spring, 1971).
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